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Abstract
The patent paradox is the over-valuing of patent protection by
industry participants despite data showing that patents have low
value, and thus must not be an efficient means of protecting
intellectual property. The portfolio theory attempts to explain the
patent paradox, based upon the assumption that the marginal
expected gain in value from the addition of a patent to a well-crafted
patent portfolio is greater than the marginal costs of acquiring the
patent. While the portfolio theory unifies prior existing theories
regarding the valuation of large firm patents, it does not take into
account the behavior of small firms in relation to their intellectual
property. This comment describes the value of patents to small firms,
and explains their relation to venture capital and litigation. This
comment also proposes that speculation into the value of innovation
of small firms, especially by venture capital, creates an initial value
in the patents ofsmallfirms.
* Third Prize, Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal 2006 Comments Contest.
t Sedn M. Coughlin is a Patent Agent at Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.
and an evening student at Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Julie Cohen
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I. INTRODUCTION
The patent paradox is the over-valuing of patent protection by
industry participants despite data showing that patents have low
value, and thus must not be an efficient means of protecting
intellectual property.' Parchomovsky and Wagner propose a portfolio
theory to explain the patent paradox.2 Their theory is based upon the
assumption that the marginal expected gain in value in the addition of
a patent to a well-crafted patent portfolio is greater than the marginal
costs of acquiring the patent. 3 The portfolio theory suggests that the
patent paradox is explained through the synergistic increase in value
that patents have, when added to a patent portfolio of related patents.4
While the portfolio theory emphasizes the real importance of
portfolios as a tool for firms to obtain broad claim scope and unifies
prior existing theories regarding the valuation of large firm patents, it
does not take into account the behavior of small firms 5 in relation to
their intellectual property. Moreover, the paradox itself is often based
on information acquired from the employees and actions of larger
companies, excluding data from small firms.6 Small firms value and
use their intellectual property in a different way from large firms.
Much of the data that show a low value for patents are based upon the
non-payment of maintenance fees and may not be able to capture the
true average value of patents, or the value of the most prized patents,
especially in the context of small firm patents.
1. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
16(2005).
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id. at 28.
4. Id. at 27.
5. Finns with fewer than 500 employees are considered small firms. See discussion infra
Section III.B.
6. For an example of a patent-effectiveness study in which "small start-up ventures,
important sources of innovation, were underrepresented" see Richard C. Levin et al.,
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 791 (1987).
7. But see Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by
Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 104 (1998) (extending research on patent renewals to
conclude that patent rights are "clearly valuable" and "equivalent to an R&D cash subsidy rate
of about 15-25%" on average across four technology fields in France); Ariel Pakes, Patents as
Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks, 54 ECONOMETRICA
755, 778-79 (1986) (applying a patent-renewal model to conclude that patent rights create
annual returns which are "nonnegligible in comparison to privately funded R&D activity" and,
in fact, such returns were equal to 13.14 percent of research and development expenditures at
business enterprises in France, Germany, and the U.K. in 1963).
EXPLAINING THE PATENT PARADOX
Section II of this comment first summarizes the portfolio theory
and explains that it does not account for two factors important for an
accurate valuation of patents. First, the portfolio theory does not take
patent claim scope into account when it describes the value of a patent
to a given portfolio. Practitioners suggest that their clients create
patent portfolios to increase claim scope. They seek multiple patents
for a variety of practical reasons involving limitations on the scope of
claims often allowed in a single given patent.9 However, as argued
below, the quality of a patent portfolio depends mostly on the scope
of the claims of the patents in the portfolio, not necessarily the
number of patents.10 The possession of large numbers of patents by
many large firms does mean that any patent reasonably related to a
patent portfolio will synergistically gain value by being added to that
portfolio.
Second, the portfolio theory ignores changes in patent value over
time. Parchomovsky and Wagner cite data estimating low average
patent value based on the non-payment of maintenance fees on many
patents, suggesting that these patents are not even valuable enough to
justify paying relatively low maintenance fees. 1 Looking at the
payment or non-payment of maintenance fees only establishes the
value of patents at the time the fees are due, not at times before the
fees are due. Many patents have a high value early on in their lives,
before payment of the first maintenance fee, because of speculation in
the value of the technology that the patent protects.
Section II concludes that although the portfolio theory may help
to explain the value of patents to large firms, it does not explain the
value of patents to small firms. Existing valuation methods contribute
8. But see Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 1, at 33 (explaining that "the breadth of
the right to exclude conferred by a patent portfolio is essentially the sum of the individual patent
rights," but "[t]he broader protection conferred by patent portfolios offers a range of benefits to
the holder different in kind as well as size from a simple collection of unrelated individual
patents.").
9. Other practical issues that can limit the scope of claims in a single U.S. patent are
patent strategies in which narrower claims are pursued during a parent patent application and
broader claims are pursued in later offspring applications. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 801-823 (8th ed. 2006) [hereinafter
MPEP] (discussing restriction and double patenting as it relates to U.S. patent applications).
10. See discussion infra Section II.
11. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 1, at 14. See also Francesca Comelli &
Mark Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 30 RAND J. ECON. 197 (1999)
(stating that "[t]ypically, more than half of all patents are voluntarily cancelled by nonpayment
within ten years of the date of patent application" and "[e]conometric studies have confirmed
that renewal fees influence the decision to patent and that more valuable patents are held
longer").
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to the perception of a patent paradox because they disguise
differences among large firm and small firm patents. Smaller firms or
individuals who are trying to break into an industry, value patents
differently than larger firms that are trying to strengthen their
positions within an industry and prevent upstarts from getting a
foothold. When these differences between patent valuation of small
and large firms are taken into account, it becomes clear that patents
are valued differentially over time and thus there is no patent paradox.
Many patents, which lapse for non-payment of the first maintenance
fee, were more valuable at an earlier period in their life. This is, in
part, why inventors and their assignees seek patent protection.
Section III describes the reasons that patents are valuable to large
firms. Large firms are trying to amass claim scope with which they
can ensnare infringers and induce licensees. This scope correlates
with portfolio size for practical reasons, but is not necessarily created
by the addition of patents to a related portfolio. The language of the
claims of the individual patents in the portfolio is what meaningfully
creates the claim scope. Valuation methods based on non-payment of
maintenance fees do not capture this dimension of patent value.
Finally, Section IV of this comment describes the value of
patents to small firms, and explains their relation to venture capital
and litigation. This comment proposes that speculation into the value
of innovation of small firms, especially by venture capital, creates an
initial value in the patents of small firms. This value is usually
ephemeral, and later drops to approximately zero for most patents.
However, a minority of these small firms experience large increases
in value evidenced, in part, by their possession of high value litigated
patents. Because of this venture capitalists can recoup their losses
realized on the majority of firms in their small firm portfolio and earn
a profit by realizing huge gains on the minority of firms in their
portfolio. Existing valuation methods based on the payment of
maintenance fees do not capture this because they only show the
value of patents at a single point in time.
II. THE PORTFOLIO THEORY DESCRIBES HOW LARGE
FIRMS PATENT, BUT DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE PATENT
PARADOX
The value of patents depends on the reasons for which they are
pursued and held. The simple addition of patents to a patent portfolio
does not increase the value of the patent portfolio in and of itself. The
value of a patent portfolio increases as the aggregate claim scope of
EXPLAINING THE PATENT PARADOX
the patents in a patent portfolio increases, in a relevant technological
field. The portfolio theory does not consider how claim scope
correlates with patent value. The portfolio theory also does not
explain why the maintenance fees of more patents are not paid,
despite the assertion of the potential value of many patents when they
are placed in a patent portfolio.
The portfolio theory is based on the presumption that patents that
are reasonably related to the subject matter of a patent portfolio will
increase the value of the patent portfolio by an amount greater than
their value taken separately.12 The theory asserts that this explains the
patent paradox.1 3 Patents that are maintained are ones that make their
way into portfolios, where they are more highly valued, while patents
with no corresponding portfolio are not maintained because of their
lower value. 
14
According to Parchomovsky and Wagner, this increase in the
value of patents in portfolios is related to two advantages: scale and
diversity.15 Advantages of scale are related to the increase in the claim
scope of a patent portfolio beyond each of its constituent patents.'
6
This increase in scope is asserted to be more than simply additive in
relation to the value of the portfolio. 17 Parchomovsky and Wagner
argue that greater patent scope associated with a portfolio allows for
greater freedom of subsequent innovation, provides strong market
position, avoids litigation,' 8 improves the firm's defensive position, 19
and enhances the firm's ability to attract capital. 20 Advantages of
diversity are related to the depth and redundancy of coverage of the
patent portfolio. Having interlocking coverage by multiple patents
will insure that protection will not dissipate if one of the patents in the
12. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 1, at 1.
13. Id. at2.
14. Id. But see id. at 42 (explaining that under the patent portfolio theory, "firms patent
heavily to maximize the benefits of patent portfolios, and such benefits are directly determined
by the quantity of patents assembled .... patenting decisions are essentially unrelated to the
value of the individual patent.").
15. Id. at 31.
16. Id. at 31-32.
17. Id. at 33. Presumably, the actual patent scope of the patent portfolio would be, at
most, additive. An overlap in the claim scope of two patents in a portfolio would not create
greater scope in the portfolio. Thus, only non-overlapping claim scope would expand the claim
scope of the portfolio.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 36.
20. Id. at 37.
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portfolio is invalidated. 2' Many of the advantages are similar to the
features stipulated above for the advantage of scale.2 2
The portfolio theory convincingly explains that patent scope is
generally greater with more patents and that greater aggregate patent
scope due to the proper manipulation of a patent portfolio is more
valuable to firms than the relatively smaller scope, usually afforded
by a single patent. This explanation, however, does not explain the
patent paradox.
First, although patent portfolios are valuable, the value of a
portfolio is related to the aggregate scope of the claims of the patents
in the portfolio, and not necessarily the number of patents in the
portfolio. The number of patents in a patent portfolio should generally
correlate with the claim scope covered by the portfolio. However,
greater claim scope is not caused by the number of patents in the
portfolio, but by the claim scope of the individual patents making up
the portfolio.
The claim scope of any single patent is limited by a number of
factors. First, restriction practice in the United States and Europe will
only allow patents to be drawn to a single invention. 3 Often claims to
variants of a single manufacture or composition of matter are required
to be claimed in different patents. Also, often methods of using and
making a manufacture or composition of matter are required to be
claimed in different patents. Thus, multiple patents are generally
required to cover a given inventive concept in all of its embodiments
and methods of making and using these variants. Second, prior art
problems may require the splitting of claim scope of an invention in
more than one application. For example, if the prior art recites a
combination of elements A and B, and an inventor shows that A and
B may be used with elements C or D, the inventor may have to file
two applications, one with claims drawn to A, B and C and the other
with claims drawn to A, B and D. Third, certain prosecution strategies
or fiscal necessities may require the pursuit of narrower claims in a
parent patent application, followed by the filing of continuation
application(s) for broader claims, or claims of different scope. Fourth,
a patentee may file an application with claims specifically drawn to
21. Id. at 38.
22. Id. at 38-39.
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2000) (stating that the Director may require independent and
distinct inventions to be filed as separate divisional applications, which would issue as distinct
patents); European Patent Convention art. 82, Oct. 5, 1973, available at European Patent Office,
http://www.epo.co.at/legal/epc/e/ma0.html (stating that each patent must be related to one
invention or a group of inventions linked so as to form one inventive concept).
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the activity of a competitor which the patentee believes is covered by
his/her patent family after a previous application issued with other
claims. Thus, more than one patent is often necessary to cover a given
innovation, and so the number of patents in a portfolio should
generally correlate with greater claim scope.
However, while this does not happen frequently in practice, it is
not impossible for a single patent to have extremely broad claims and
to be a "super-patent" unto itself.24 A super-patent would have a
broad independent claim, and numerous dependent claims. Dependent
claims define narrowed embodiments within the scope of the
independent claim. 25 If this one super-patent covered the same scope
as a portfolio with similar claims spread over multiple patents, the
value of the patent portfolio would not be much greater than that of
the single super-patent.
Having many patents does not necessarily provide greater
protection against a claim of substantive invalidity than having fewer
patents or even one patent. Claims are rejected separately for lack of
novelty, obviousness, enablement, utility or written description. A
patent application as a whole is not rejected if one of its claims is not
26patentable. Likewise, a patent is not wholly invalidated if one of its
claims is later found to be invalid. The patent's other claims would
still stand, if they were held valid. To render a whole patent invalid
based on the substantive validity of the patent's claims each of its
claims would have to be found invalid. Thus, the risk of substantive
invalidation of a given claim should not change whether it is present
in one patent containing a number of claims or multiple patents
contain the same number of claims. Multiple patents do not provide a
safer substrate for claims insofar as protecting claims from
substantive invalidation.
A greater number of patents in a portfolio may protect against
findings of inequitable conduct. Having claims in multiple patents
would be slightly safer in the face of a finding of inequitable conduct
in one of the patents. Examples of inequitable conduct include
27withholding prior art from the USPTO during prosecution,
24. A super patent is a single patent with a very broad claim scope. But see
Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 1, at 32 (describing a patent portfolio as a "super-patent").
25. MPEP, supra note 9, § 608.0 1(n).
26. Pending claims in a patent application are examined on a claim-by-claim basis,
however a patent application would not be allowed while it contained rejected claims. However,
deletion of rejected claims from a patent application with allowed claims would lead to issuance
of the application as a patent.
27. MPEP, supra note 9, § 2001.
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withholding the best mode of using the invention known at the time of
filing from the patent application, 28 or practicing fraud before the
USPTO, generally. 29 A finding of inequitable conduct results in the
invalidation of the patent, and all of the claims therein. 30 Thus, having
multiple patents may diminish the chances that any one was
invalidated under inequitable conduct. However, inequitable conduct
is relatively rare when compared to claims of invalidity of individual
claims of a patent. Additionally, if a group of patents were drawn to
the same subject matter and are related to each other, and thus likely
to have been prosecuted at the same time and by the same people, it is
more likely that a finding of inequitable conduct in one patent will
result in a finding of inequitable conduct in another. While having
claims spread through multiple patents is still helpful, it is unlikely
that this relatively small increase in value would justify the assertion
that the addition of each patent to a patent portfolio drawn to related
technology would synergistically increase the value of the portfolio.
Thus, a patent portfolio provides only a marginally safer
substrate for patent claims than a single super-patent. The redundancy
of a patent portfolio provides protection from findings of inequitable
conduct, but these findings occur rarely. Generally, greater patent
scope can only be accorded through the procurement of multiple
patents, so, from a practical standpoint patent portfolio size does
correlate with claim scope breadth. This is so, not because each patent
that is relatively related to the subject matter of the portfolio is
synergistically more valuable when included in the portfolio than
when it is excluded from it, but because of practical considerations
affecting the acquisition of patent claim scope during the prosecution
of patents. The portfolio theory does, to some extent, account for why
large firms value patents at all; however, it does not fully account for
the patent paradox.
The second reason the portfolio theory does not explain the
patent paradox is that if a patent would have increased value if it were
held in a portfolio, it should still have some value alone. However,
based on the valuation methods cited by Parchomovsky and Wagner,
the value of individual patents does not reflect this portfolio
dependent value.
The valuation methods which Parchomovsky and Wagner cite in
their paper use non-payment of maintenance fees to determine the
28. MPEP, supra note 9, § 2165.
29. MPEP, supra note 9, § 2016.
30. Id.
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value of patents.3 ' In most countries, maintenance fees must be paid
to keep the patent in force.32 If these fees are not paid, it can be
presumed that the patents are not as valuable as the maintenance fee.
3 3
This valuation method demonstrates the patent paradox in that patents
are largely not maintained, meaning that they must not be worth even
as much as the maintenance fee, which is generally less than the cost
of acquiring the patents in the first place.34
If this is the case, for the maintenance fee valuation test to jibe
with the portfolio theory, the patent market must be extremely
inefficient because under the portfolio theory most patents should be
valuable when they are placed in the appropriate portfolio. If the
patenting firm owns a patent portfolio, and the value of the patents in
the portfolio is realized, then the firm would pay the maintenance fees
on the patents in the portfolio. If a patent would fit better into another
firm's portfolio, a portfolio owning firm would negotiate with the
patent owning firm for rights to the patent in order to capture the
synergistic value in its portfolio. Even in the situation where a firm
could not afford to pay a maintenance fee, it would be able to sell the
portfolio or parts of it to another party who would find the patents
useful as a portfolio. It is unlikely that a firm would not know what is
in its own patent portfolio. It is also unlikely that a patent portfolio
holder would allow the patent of another to go abandoned if it had use
for it in its portfolio and it could acquire ownership of the patent.
Patents are easily searchable because they must be published in order
to receive patent grants, and search engines are available in the United
States and Europe. 35 Thus, it seems unlikely that the market for patent
licensing is inefficient; at least in terms of knowing what patents may
be eligible for licensing. For the portfolio theory to mesh with data
showing non-payment of maintenance fees, there must be much
acrimony in patenting licensing deals generally, with patent owners
31. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 1, at 14.
32. In the United States, maintenance fees must be paid at 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years from
issue. These fees are $900, $2300 and $3800 respectively (small entities pay half). Ass'n of
Corporate Counsel, Intellectual Property Primer,
http://www.dicksteinshapiro.com/files/upload/IP_Primer.pdf, at 106 (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
In Europe, renewal fees are due every year after the third year from patent grant. The fee is E380
at 3 years and increases every year until it is E1020 at year 10 and every subsequent year.
European Patent Convention, supra note 23, art. 86.
33. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 1, at 14.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office,
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007); European Patent Office,
http://ep.espacenet.com/advancedSearch?locale=enep (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
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refusing to maintain patents that should be bringing in at least some
licensing dollars. I cannot find any evidence of widespread refusal to
deal in patent licensing and Parchomovsky and Wagner do not show
any evidence of this.
Alternatively, many patents may be allowed to expire because
there is no existing portfolio into which these expired patents could
have been placed. Perhaps the expired patents are simply outside the
claim scope of all existing portfolios and cannot be readily absorbed
by them because they are not reasonably related to any portfolio. This
is entirely possible, and would fit with this comment's theory that the
patenting behavior of small firms is different from large firms, and in
part accounts for the patent paradox. To better appreciate the
differential value of patents it is important to examine the patenting
behavior of large firms, as explained in Section III, as compared to
small firms as explained in Section IV.
III. THE PORTFOLIO THEORY'S EXPLANATION OF WHY
LARGE FIRMS VALUE PATENTS AT ALL
The portfolio theory has the greatest explanatory power in terms
of the patenting strategies of large firms. Large firms have other
methods of protecting their intellectual property besides patents,36 but
still make up the top firms that are acquiring patents.37 The portfolio
theory explains that larger firms are not necessarily acquiring patents
to protect their technology alone, but also to leverage their portfolios
into licensing dollars and to repress Schumpter's "creative
destruction" by inhibiting the growth of upstart competitors in their
areas of technological expertise. Also, large firm patent portfolios
help large firms to defend their territory from interlopers by
discouraging litigation of their patents and maintaining the firms'
access to research areas.
Large firms have non-patent tactics to protect intellectual
property that smaller firms do not have. These tactics include
branding strategies, manipulation of lead-time and learning curve
advantages.38 Branding strategies allow larger, better known firms to
keep consumers coming back to their brand to purchase a given
product. 39 Thus, if a competitor attempted to move into the market in
36. Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1251, 1299-1303 (2004).
37. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. 625, 642 n.50 (2002).
38. Bamett, supra note 36, at 1259; Levin et al., supra note 6, at 783-84.
39. Barnett, supra note 36, at 1259.
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which a large firm was operating, even if the interloper firm could
match the quality of the large firm product, the interloper firm would
face an uphill battle in order to take market share away from the large
incumbent firm.40 However, even matching the incumbent firm's
product would be a challenge. Absent patent protection, an incumbent
firm could protect the product or best methods of making and
distributing the product as a trade secret. 41 Thus, an interloper firm
would have to repeat any research the incumbent firm undertook.42
Further, nothing would prevent the incumbent firm from continuing
its research to keep itself ahead of any interloper firm trying to move
in on the incumbent firm's market share.43 Many large firms find that
these methods are more important to maintaining market dominance
than patents.44
These methods for staying ahead of interloper competition leave
one wondering why large firms patent at all, because as mentioned
above, they patent more than smaller firms.45 As the portfolio theory
explains, large firms patent to maintain portfolios of patents that they
can use to defend the market in which the firms are operating, and to
yield licensing dollars. These portfolios are more useful for defense
and for profit when they have greater claim scope. Large firms are not
necessarily looking to their portfolios to defend discrete inventions
from infringement. Because of the factors explained above, large
firms do not have to worry as much as smaller firms have to about
infringement. Because these portfolios are used for defense and
independently derived profit, the greater the claim scope of these
portfolios, the greater value they have for the large firms that hold
them. This claim scope is generally attained by adding patents to the
portfolio because of the practical limits of patent scope in single
patents as explained in Section II above.
There is a tendency for larger firms to be perceived as focusing
more on incremental research than innovative research.46 For
example, IBM was perceived as dominating its field of technology





44. Levin et al., supra note 6, at 784.
45. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
46. Barnett, supra note 36, at 1286.
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the 21 major innovations.4 7 This is not because IBM did not invest in
research. IBM invested $4.2 billion, while the research and
development costs of its four largest competitors combined was $1.4
billion.48 The lack of domination of the innovation in its field by IBM
suggests that IBM's research dollars went somewhere else besides the
innovation of new products. Most likely the money went to make
IBM's existing products better.49
This allocation of research and development efforts makes sense
for large firms. Large firms have an incentive to incrementally
improve and debug their existing innovations, but less incentive to
undertake more expensive and risky innovation which is more likely
to render the large firm's existing innovation obsolete.5 ° Even if a
large incumbent firm won at the innovative research game, it may still
ultimately lose. Innovative research tends to replace the product
currently dominating the given market.51 If an incumbent firm already
owns the product that is dominating a given market, it would have no
incentive to replace itself.52 A large incumbent firm would be better
off buying a smaller company that had created hopeful innovative
results than undertaking the risk itself.
IBM's choices regarding how to invest its research and
development money are reflected in this sort of patent strategy. This
past year, IBM again had more issued patents than any other
company.5 3 IBM generally acquires many patents with limited claim
scope in each patent, increasing the number of patents necessary to
cover a given claim scope and increasing the number of patents in its
portfolio. IBM's patent practice develops a large portfolio, which
IBM uses to control the technological landscape around its central
inventions and generate licensing dollars in this area.
Large firms are not trying to protect new innovation, but trying
to protect incremental improvements of the major innovation from
which they are already profiting. Large firms often have become large
by innovating when they were smaller. Then, they take this innovative
47. Richard J. Rosen, Research and Development with Asymmetric Firm Sizes, 22 RAND
J. ECON. 411, 411-12 (1991).
48. Id. at 412.
49. Id.
50. Barnett, supra note 36, at 1259.
51. Rosen, supra note 47, at 412.
52. Id.
53. IBM had 2,941 patents in 2005 according to the USPTO (over 1,000 more patents
than its next highest competitor). United States Patent and Trademark Office Press Release
Archive, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/05-03.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
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core, amplify it and defend it. Large firms are using a defensive
approach to patenting by maintaining portfolios including patents
with claim scope that encompasses their main technology and small
improvements of that technology. 54 Large firms could simply rely on
lead-time and brand loyalty to keep them ahead of the competition.
For example, the success of name brand drugs such as Tylenol® and
Advil® which have long been off patent in light of cheaper store brand
equivalents, would seem to militate against acquiring any patent
protection. The use of patents allows incumbent firms to rest on their
laurels and delay research that will keep them ahead of their
competition because their competitors are limited from innovating by
the large firm's patent portfolio. Also, large firms are able to leverage
their patent portfolios into licensing dollars, giving additional
incentive for them to pursue patent protection.
One could conclude that large firms are behaving as described in
Kitch's prospect theory. 55 For example, IBM was reported to have
collected over $500 million in 1999 from its patent holdings.56
Arguably, IBM is organizing members of its industry to manage parts
of IBM's portfolio that it does not have the resources to implement.57
On the other hand, IBM's activities could be seen as defensively
stifling innovation in the intellectual space around its patents by
patenting slight variants of methods that are already in wide use. 58 For
example, IBM has been searching for infringers of its portfolio and
negotiating licenses, or suing them.59 This does not, on its face,
resemble a Kitch-like prospector organizing innovation, rather it
resembles an ensconced party managing innovation so that its
products are not replaced.
The portfolio theory seems to describe the value of patents to
large companies. Large companies patent around their existing
technology in order to accrete a large claim scope breadth and capture
infringers or induce licenses. The revenue from licenses from these
infringers may be considerable, while at the same time allowing a
54. Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J.
ECON. 101, 125 (2001).
55. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265 (1977).
56. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 440 n.21 (2004).
57. Kitch, supra note 55, at 277-78 (explaining that patents allows patent holders to
signal to firms with complementary technology for cooperation).
58. See Tim O'Reilly, The Internet Patent Land Grab, 43 CoMM. ACM 29 (2000).
59. Id.
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large incumbent firm to manage the research occurring around its
main technology, and to know and modulate its research
expenditures. While large firms do not need patent protection in order
to successfully profit from their technology, their patent portfolios
generate additional income on top of sales from whatever innovation
has been developed by the large firm. Thus, patent portfolios of
increasing scope that can catch more infringers have greater value,
because the larger the net the greater chance of significant license
revenue. Additional scope may lead to super-additive licensing
depending upon the subject matter of the large firm's portfolio and
the actions of its competitors.
IV. VALUATION OF PATENTS POSSESSED BY SMALL
FIRMS: VENTURE CAPITAL SPECULATION IN LITIGABLE
HIGH VALUE PATENTS EXPLAINS THE PATENT
PARADOX
The portfolio theory shows why and how large firms patent but,
as discussed in Section II, does not fully explain the patent paradox.
First, the portfolio theory does not take into account the scope of
patent claims. Patents have differential value depending on their
scope. Second, the portfolio theory does not take into account the
value of patents over time. Both of these factors affect how small
firms patent. This section fills in the gap left by the portfolio theory,
by focusing on why and how small firms patent. The portfolio theory
and the underlying paradox rely on patent valuation methods that are
not meaningful in all contexts. The non-payment of a maintenance fee
means that a patent is not valuable now, in or out of a patent portfolio.
That does not mean that it was never valuable.
Taking the portfolio theory in combination with the patenting
behavior of small firms offers a more comprehensive view of the
patent paradox. First, the patents of small firms tend to have
differential patent value over time. This allows small firms to raise
money for research through venture capital. Because small firms tend
to patent more innovative subject matter with greater risk involved in
its eventual commercialization than large firms, the value of their
patents is realized, in part, through speculation on the value of these
innovative technologies.
Second, small firms tend to have more extremely high value
patents as measured in part by the high value of a subset of patents
that tend to be litigated. The value of these litigated patents also
correlates with structural differences that have been related to higher
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patent value including greater claim scope. 60 Further, the structure and
claims of the patents of small firms show a greater emphasis on
acquiring and protecting more claim scope. Small firms and
individuals generally have not found and successfully commercialized
a technology of their own. They are instead attempting to innovate a
profitable technology to arrive at large firm status either by being
acquired by a larger firm or by generating revenue off of a new
valuable technology. Thus, patents filed by smaller firms will be
directed to wholly new technologies. Small firms have little incentive
to generate relatively small incremental increases in their value, since
they often are not publicly held, and often are run by a management
that has incentives to build the company quickly at the cost of greater
risk.6 1 Thus, patents held by smaller firms tend to embody more
research, take longer to prosecute, and have more claims, indicating
that they may be more innovative and more valuable. 62 This supports
theories that describe smaller firms as the real engines of innovation,
while larger firms slow innovation by putting more of an emphasis on
defending what they already have.
63
The use of patents by small firms requires a different method of
valuing the patents of small firms. Speculative investment, in the form
of venture capital, tends to elevate the value of small firm patents,
especially early on. Usually, this speculation does not bear fruit and
results in the non-maintenance of the patents drawn to the technology
of the small firms; however, this does not mean that the patents were
never valuable. The potential upside value of these patents is
demonstrated by the high value patents which are litigated. This
speculation to find innovation defined by high value patents, at least
in part, explains the patent paradox. Thus, the patents of small firms
are valued, often by venture capital firms, by the value of the
innovations they create and on how these innovations perform during
their attempted commercialization in the market. A marker for patents
that have been estimated at extremely high value is the willingness of
parties to litigate matters related to these patents.
60. Allison et al., supra note 56, at 438, 463.
61. Barnett, supra note 36, at 1255.
62. Allison et al., supra note 56, at 438, 463.
63. Rosen, supra note 47, at 411-12.
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A. Speculation on the Value of Small Firm Patents: An
Explanation for the Patent Paradox
The patent paradox can be, at least in part, attributed to
speculation in small firm technology by venture capital organizations.
Venture capitalists generally trade capital to small firms for stock in
the small firm. Often venture capitalists require a controlling share in
order to have influence over the management of the small firm.64
Recently, venture capitalists have focused almost exclusively on
technology-based small firms.65 In 2000, 91% of venture capital
investments were in technology and Internet related companies,
according to one national survey.66 Venture capitalists generally try to
have a total investment time of seven years. 67 In this time, venture
capitalists hope for a large return on their investment, in part to
compensate for the high failure rate in venture capital investments of
approximately 75%.68 The goal of many venture capitalists is to have
several of a fund's "portfolio" of companies undergo an IPO or a sale
of the company for cash or tradable securities.6 9
Venture capital investments in technology companies have
increased since 1979, when a clarification by the U.S. Department of
Labor led to retirement accounts being able to invest more heavily in
venture capital. 70 During the period from 1983-1992, venture capital
accounted for 3% of the research money spent, but also for 8% of the
innovations developed.7' More recently, in 2000, venture capital
investors committed $104 billion to 5,458 transactions, up from 1990
levels of just $3.4 billion and 1,317 deals.72 Thus, venture capital has
become a significant source of money for innovative development
from small firms.
64. National Venture Capital Association, http://www.nvca.org/def.html (last visited Dec.
16, 2006).
65. Id.
66. Kyle C. Jackson, An Adventure for the Iowa Legislator: Venture Capital in the Value-
Added Industry -A Comprehensive Look at the Iowa Agricultural Finance Corporation, 9
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 255, 266 (2004).
67. Id.
68. John R. Harbison & Peter Pekar, Jr., A Practical Guide to Alliances: Leapfrogging:
The Learning Curve A Perspective For U.S. Companies, 1063 PLI/Corp 9, 15 (1998) (Exhibit
2).
69. Ross P. Barrett, Investing in Louisiana: Venture Capital Quick Facts, 49 LA. B.J.
306, 307 (2002).
70. Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to
Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 675 (2000).
71. Id.
72. Barrett, supra note 69, at 306-07.
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This increase in venture capital financing has driven a
significantly higher patenting rate, and is associated with innovative
and valuable patents.73 Kortum and Lerner show a correlation
between the increase in patenting in certain industries (such as the
drug, office, and computing machine industries), and the increase in
venture capital investment in these industries.74 Further, Kortum and
Lerner show that this effect on patenting by venture capital represents
real innovation and not patenting because of the nature of venture
capital investment.
75
Kortum and Lerner also assessed the value of the patents which
were generated by venture capital supported firms, and found that
76venture capital supported firms tend to litigate their patents more.
As the next section will discuss, this supports the innovative value of
these patents.77
The management of a venture capital supported firm may patent
for reasons other than innovation. 78 Firstly, the management may not
trust the venture capitalist not to exploit their ideas. 79 Typically,
venture capitalists invest in more than one company. A venture
capitalist, depending on the economic situation of the companies in its
portfolio, may have an incentive to transfer patentable ideas from one
company to another. 80 Thus, prior to discussing an innovation with a
venture capitalist, the management may file a patent application
drawn to the innovation despite not knowing whether the innovation
will be valuable or not, as a relatively cheap way to protect
themselves. Secondly, the management of a venture capital supported
firm may file and prosecute patent applications in order to enhance
the firm's attractiveness to venture capitalists. 8' It is often difficult for
venture capitalists to assess the value of the patent portfolio of a firm,
and the presence of more patents in a portfolio may give the
73. Kortum & Lerner, supra note 70, at 675.
74. Kortum & Lerner, supra note 70 app. at 8 tbl.A-l, 9 tbl.A-2, available at
http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlernerVCInnov.Supp.pdf.
75. Kortum & Lerner, supra note 70, at 689.
76. Id. at 690.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 689, 691.
79. Id. at 689.
80. See id. (suggesting that there is "a real possibility that entrepreneurs' ideas will be
directly or indirectly transferred to other companies.").
81. Id.
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impression that the portfolio is more valuable merely because there
are more patents in it.
82
While most firms in a venture capital portfolio will not succeed,
the ones that do succeed do so to such a degree that the venture
capital portfolio as a whole is still profitable. Venture capitalists
perform research into the value of companies and the probability of
the successful commercialization of their technology. Thus, at an
early stage these companies are, at least to some degree, valued by
venture capitalists. Likewise, their patent portfolios are also valued.
Over time, the value of most of these small firms diminishes to zero
or near zero, and likewise, so does the value of the patents in their
portfolios. So, the maintenance fees of these patents are not paid.
However, a subset of small firms in which venture capitalists invest
turn a profit, and many of these turn a substantial profit.
Most of the patent portfolios of small firms have an increase in
value early in the life of the firm when it is able to acquire venture
capital backing. Later, in the life of the firm, the technology
represented by the patent portfolio either sinks or swims. A minority
of the firms and their portfolios increase greatly in value, while, for
most of the firms, the value decreases to zero. Thus, even in a
situation where most patents are not maintained, small firm portfolios
as a group are still, on average, valuable enough to justify the expense
of generating them.
B. A Subset of the Patents Owned by Small Firms Have High
Value as Demonstrated by Their Tendency to Be Litigated
Small firm patents and large firm patents differ both structurally,
in how their claims are drafted and prosecuted, and also in value.
Patent litigation is a marker of a certain patent structure and
extremely high patent value. Litigated patents tend to be of extremely
high value at least at some point in their patent term and are
disproportionately owned by small firms. Litigated patents should be
among the most valuable patents. 83 Obviously litigation is expensive,
and so would only be undertaken if the underlying patent rights were
82. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that the value of patents is a
"seemingly insoluble puzzle" that "has occupied a generation of patent scholars and policy-
makers"), 41-42 ("firms patent heavily to maximize the benefits of patent portfolios, and such
benefits are directly determined by the quantity of patents assembled.").
83. See Allison et al., supra note 56, at 439 (stating that "litigated patents tend to be much
more valuable than others on average" and "[w]hile not every valuable patent is necessarily
litigated ... the relationship is strong enough to justify the conclusion that litigated patents are a
good proxy for valuable patents.").
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valuable. For patent suits with between $1 million and $25 million at
stake, litigation costs averaged $2 million per side.84 As further proof,
litigated patents also have other traits that correlate with scholarly
predictions of value.
85
Patents that are litigated tend to have more patent claims than
non-litigated patents. 86 Some have posited that the number of claims
in a patent is indicative of increased claim scope. 87 While this is not
necessarily so, it is more expensive to prosecute more claims,
suggesting that a patent with more claims is more important to the
applicant. 88 Also, a patent application being prosecuted in anticipation
of litigation may have more claims in order to make the document
more useful in litigation, by more particularly claiming the activity or
product of a potential infringer. 89 Thus, the finding of more claims in
a patent that was prosecuted for litigation may be circularly caused by
the intent for litigation. However, at least, the value of the subject
matter protected by the patent must be higher at least at the time of
filing and prosecution if the applicant is spending more money.
Litigated patents also contain more prior art citations. 90
Additional citations may be indicative of more intense involvement
on the part of the inventors during prosecution, since it is generally
the inventors, and not the attorneys or agents prosecuting the patent
applications, who are most familiar with the prior art. This
involvement of the inventors may indicate that the invention is more
important to them during prosecution. Also, more prior art searching 91
may have been done in anticipation of the investment into research
upon which the patent is based. There is a duty to disclose relevant art
in the United States.92 Thus, performing a search and finding relevant
art would impose a requirement to cite this art to the examiner during
prosecution. More citations cited during a patent's prosecution tends
to show more thought put into the subject matter of the patent, and
perhaps a higher importance placed on the patent. Further, patents that
are litigated tend to have more self-citations, implying that they are
84. Id. at 441.
85. Id. at 448.
86. Id. at 451.
87. Id. at 449.
88. Id. at 452.
89. Id. at 452-53.
90. Id. at 453.
91. Further prior art searching is generally not required when filing a patent application.
92. MPEP, supra note 9, § 2001.
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more likely to be parts of larger patent families.93 This also implies
that the subject matter of the patent is important enough to undertake
the expense of filing and prosecuting multiple patent applications.
Also, litigated patents tend to be cited in other patents much
more often than non-litigated patents.94 If other patentees are
referencing a patent, this may mean that the technological area in
which the patent exists is an area in which more development is
taking place. However, it may also merely be an indicator that the
patent is better known because of litigation.
From the above, it seems that litigated patents tend to have
higher value than non-litigated patents. During litigation, firms are
willing to invest millions in these patents, making them exponentially
more valuable than patents for which maintenance fees are not paid.
Also, the other characteristics of these patents suggest that even
before the patents were actually litigated, there were additional
resources used to generate these patents, suggesting that they were, on
average, more valuable to their applicants than other patents even
from the beginning, when the technology upon which the patents
were based may have been subject to venture capital speculation.
These more valuable litigated patents tend to be owned by
smaller firms and individuals. 95 For example, in a study performed by
Allison, Lemley, Moore, and Trunkey (Allison study), 39.2% of
patents owned by small entities, as defined by the USPTO, were
litigated, while other patents were only litigated 13.6% of the time.
96
Seventy one percent of patents that were not litigated were initially
issued to large firms, while only 37% of litigated patents were
initially issued to large firms..9 7 This would tend to show that this high
value subset of patents is more common to smaller than larger firms.
In further support of the notion of the disproportionate
possession of high value patents by small firms, a study by Lanjouw
and Schankerman shows an inverse correlation between patent
93. Allison et al., supra note 56, at 454. This should be distinguished from a large patent
portfolio. A patent family is a group of patents that claim priority to each other. A patent
application claims the priority of another application by having the same disclosure (a
continuation or a divisional application) or a usually slightly modified disclosure (a
continuation-in-part application). This new application is used to acquire different, although
somewhat related claims. Usually portfolios encompass many patent families or patents from
various patent families.
94. Id. at 455.
95. Id. at 465.
96. Id. at 466. Small entities, as defined by the USPTO, include individuals, small
businesses, and non-profits. See MPEP, supra note 9, § 509.02.
97. Allison et al., supra note 56, at 466.
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portfolio size and litigation, saying that the smaller the portfolio, the
more likely litigation is to occur. 98 They assert that this correlation is
also true for small firms. 99 That is, smaller firms with more patents
are less likely to litigate any of their patents than smaller firms with
fewer patents. 00 While Lanjouw and Schankerman's data seem to
suggest that there is still a correlation between small firm size and
possession of litigated patents, 0 1 the inverse correlation between
portfolio size and litigation probability seems to be stronger. Upon
closer scrutiny, however, it appears that Lanjouw and Schankerman's
data probably supports Allison's assertions that small firms have a
greater tendency to litigate patents than large firms.
The key distinction between Lanjouw and Schankerman's study
and the Allison study is the definition of small firms. Lanjouw and
Schankerman define a small firm as one with fewer than 5,425
employees. 10 2 Thus, many firms that are fairly large such as Biogen
Idec (3,340 employees) 10 3 and Millennium Pharmaceuticals (1,142
employees) 10 4 would be considered "small firms" in Lanjouw and
Schankerman's study. The Allison study defined small firms the same
way the USPTO does, as having fewer than 500 employees.' 0 5 It is
unlikely that firms which were defined as small firms under the
USPTO rule would have the larger patent portfolios measured in
Lanjouw and Schankerman's study, containing greater than 100
patents. Most of the "small listed"' 0 6 firms in Lanjouw and
Schankerman's study were probably not small entities by the USPTO
definition. Firms of fewer than 500 employees would rarely be able to
afford large portfolios. This is further evidenced by the behavior of
"small listed firms" with larger patent portfolios. These "small listed
firms" with patent portfolios of greater than 100 patents seemed to
98. Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are
Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 47 (2004).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 57 tbl.3.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 52. This is the median number of employees in their study.
103. Hoover's Online,




(last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
105. 13 C.F.R. § 121.802 (2006).
106. Lanjouw and Schankerman refer to firms traded on the stock market as "listed" firms.
Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 98, at 52.
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litigate about as often as large listed firms. 10 7 On the other hand,
unlisted companies in Lanjouw and Schankennan's study had the
highest rates of patent litigation especially when the unlisted firms
had patent portfolios of fewer than 100 patents. 108 Lanjouw and
Schankerman's "unlisted firms" category, especially unlisted firms
with patent portfolios of fewer than 100 patents, should represent
some of the smallest entities measured in that study, 109 many of
which would be small entities as defined by the USPTO and Allison.
Further, even listed small firns with small patent portfolios probably
contain many small entities by the USPTO definition.
For purposes of this comment, small firms are defined using the
USPTO definition. While there must be differential patenting
behavior between larger firms, such as Biogen Idec and huge firns
such as Pfizer (106,000 employees)" 0  and Amgen (16,500
employees),"' these differences are not parts of the explanation for
the patent paradox put forth here.
Small firms are more likely than large firms to have extremely
high value patents as measured by enhanced litigation of small firm
patents. This, coupled with the ability to reap large returns from a
small company which makes a marketable innovative invention,
results in speculative investment in the technologies of small firms
and thereby, their patents. Largely, speculation in the value of
innovative technologies comes out of venture capital money. Most
firms that venture capital firms invest in do not produce a return on
the investment. Venture capital firms depend on large returns on a
few of the members of their portfolio to recoup this high failure rate.
This venture capital money and its increase in use over the last two
decades is what largely accounts for the patent paradox.
V. CONCLUSION
The patent paradox is resolved in two ways. The first is that
despite not needing patent protection to remain dominant in their
technology market, large firms patent to generate additional income
107. Id. at 57 tbl.3.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 66 tbl.7.
110. Hoover's Online,
http://www.hoovers.com/pfizer/-ID 11175-/free-co-factsheet.xhtml (last visited Jan. 20,
2007).
Ill. Hoover's Online,
http://www.hoovers.com/amgen/-ID 12623-/free-co-factsheet.xhtml (last visited Jan. 20,
2007).
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through the licensing of their portfolios and to defend their existing
technologies. The second is that small firms patent in order to protect
their technology, and in a sense, advertise for support by venture
capital. The investment of venture capital into the speculative market
of innovative small firm technology explains the low value of patents
when looked at from the perspective of maintenance fee payment.
Small firms do value the protection that patents afford because they
do not have the same alternatives for the protection of their
technology that large firms do. Further, the often radical changes in
the value of small firm patents over time and the tendency of
extremely high value litigated patents to be owned by small firms
explains the patent paradox. The extreme differences in the values of
small firm patents by the time of the payment of maintenance fees on
these patents shows that valuation by maintenance fee payment does
not capture the high value of these litigated patents, and generates the
false appearance of a patent paradox, supported by the assertion of
large firms that they do not need patents.
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